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By Ullrich Heilemann, Leipzig, Germany, Herman Stekler, Washington, D.C., USA2 
JEL E37 
Forecast evaluations, macroeconomic forecasting, accuracy limits 
Summary 
This paper asks  whether the accuracy of German macroeconomic forecasts has im-
proved over time. We examine one-year-ahead forecasts of rates of real GDP growth 
and inflation for the years 1967 to 2010 by three major German forecasters and the 
OECD. We find that overall error levels are high but not much different from those for 
the U.S. and U.K. In the 1980s and 1990s accuracy improved somewhat, but has now 
returned to its 1970s level, indicating that it reflects the variance of growth and inflation. 
Benchmark comparisons of these predictions with ex post forecasts of a macroecono-
metric model indicate that accuracy can be improved but it will be difficult to achieve.   
 
                                                 
1   Dedicated to the memory of Victor Zarnowitz (November 3, 1919 – February 21, 2009) a great econ-
omist, a sceptic on economic forecasting, and a good friend to both authors. 
2   For excellent research assistance the authors are indebted to Sissy Issleb. For critical comments we 
thank Roland Döhrn, Heinz Josef Münch, Essen, Germany, and two anonymous referees. The finan-
cial support of Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SFB 475, “Reduction of complexity in multivari-
ate data structures”) is gratefully acknowledged.  2 
1. Introduction 
Quantitative forecasting in Germany began in earnest in the early 1960s when the “Ge-
meinschaftsdiagnose” (Joint Diagnosis (JD)) of five (now four) large economic research 
institutes started to publish forecasts fully consistent with the National Accounts (NA) 
framework  (Antholtz 2005, pp.  31ff.).  These  forecasts  were soon followed  by  the 
“Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung” 
(Council of Economic Experts) and the Federal Government’s “Jahreswirschaftsbericht 
der Bundesregierung” (Annual Economic Report of the Federal Government). In the 
1970s, an increasing number of private forecasters, most of them from the banking sec-
tor, also started to issue macroeconomic forecasts. Including the IMF, the OECD, the 
World Bank, and the EU-Commission, there are now more than 35 institutions that reg-
ularly publish macroeconomic forecasts for Germany. Only a small number of them are 
as detailed as the JD, CEE or the GAER, and only about a dozen of them receive public 
attention. 
The general state  of the art in  such  macroeconomic forecasting is surveyed in Fil-
des/Stekler (2002) and Stekler (2009). The present paper presents an in-depth examina-
tion of the accuracy of the rate of growth forecasts for real GDP and inflation (GDP 
deflator) for Germany from 1967 to 2010 to examine (1) whether accuracy has im-
proved over time and (2) whether the characteristics of these forecasts are similar to 
those of the U.S. and U.K. In addition, we use ex post econometric model results to re-
flect on the increase in forecast accuracy that can be expected. Of course, there are other 
criteria besides accuracy that determine the quality of forecasts such as their informa-
tional content or their theoretical foundation (Wild, 1974, p. 138). But there are few 
users for whom accuracy is not the most important criterion, not least because there are 
few differences between major forecasters on the other criteria.   
Related papers include Öller and Barot, 2000; Pons, 2000; Kreinin, 2000; Blix et al., 
2001; Döpke and Fritsche, 2006; and Kholodilin and Siliverstovs, 2009. These studies 
report the usual statistics for absolute and relative accuracy or other forecast characteris-
tics over a specific span of time. Depending on the forecasters and the forecasting peri-
od, the mean absolute errors (MAE) of the forecasts of the rate of real GDP growth (in-
flation) vary between 1.2 (0.6) and 1.6 (0.8). Most studies concluded that there is no 3 
forecaster (or method) that is uniformly superior (Döpke and Fritsche, 2006). These 
findings are similar to results for the U.S. (e.g. Zarnowitz, 1992). 
However, these studies lack an explicit systematic analysis of the way that accuracy has 
changed over time. Dicke/Glismann (2002) offer a brief analysis of forecast accuracy 
over time for one of the research institutions, and Döpke/Fritsche (2006) suggest that 
accuracy may have improved. Other studies make implicit references to this question, 
e.g. Döpke and Langfeldt, 1995; Heilemann, 1998; and Döpke, 2000. The findings are 
contradictory, and there are no definitive conclusions (e.g. Burns, 1986; McNees, 1988; 
Melliss, 1997; Öller and Barot, 2000; Vogel, 2007; and Timmerman, 2007). A remarka-
ble but much overlooked result was Zarnowitz’ (1992) finding that the accuracy of U.S. 
real GDP forecasts for the period 1953 to 1989 had not improved. It is therefore appro-
priate to revisit the question of whether forecasts have improved over time. The results 
are taken as an occasion to inquire after the limits of accuracy that can currently be ex-
pected from macroeconomic forecasts. Though an explanation of our main findings is 
beyond the scope of this paper, they represent a first step in this direction. 
The next section will discuss our sample of forecasters, the time periods that will be 
examined, and the methods of analysis. Section 3 has the full sample results; section 4 
presents the results over time. The final section summarizes the findings and offers con-
clusions and suggestions. 
    
2. Forecasters, samples, data, methods of analysis 
Among the dozen major macroeconomic forecasts for Germany, only four sets of fore-
casts are examined here. The criteria used in selecting these forecasting organizations 
were: they should play an important role in the public discussion of economic policies 
and they must have produced a sufficient number of forecasts to determine whether their 
accuracy has improved over time. Private sector  forecasters with a published  long 
enough record do not exist. In addition, we wanted to include forecasts from both a gov-
ernment institution and an international organization. Finally, the forecasts had to be 
comparable in terms of the set of variables forecast, the forecast horizon, and the date of 
their publication. This led to the selection of the forecasts produced by (1) the JD (Ar-4 
beitsgemeinschaft, 1967ff.),3 (2) the CEE (Sachverständigenrat, 1967ff.), (3) the GAER 
(Bundesregierung, 1967ff.), and (4) the OECD (1967ff.).   
We consider two crucial variables: the rates of change of real GDP and of the GDP de-
flator. “Growth” and “no inflation” are the most important macroeconomic goals for 
German economic policy. Given the strong dependence of employment, government 
deficits, etc. on GDP, the accuracy of these two variables are good indicators of what 
might be expected for the other variables.  
In order to have a common base, the analysis starts with 1967, the first year for which 
the GAER published a forecast. The sample ends in 2010. Despite German unification 
in 1990, for the period 1991 to 1994 we still use forecasts for West Germany. To exam-
ine the evolution of forecast accuracy, the sample is divided into four sub periods: 1970-
1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999,  and 2000-2010.  These  decades  are frequently used in 
analyses of the type done here. Each decade experienced at least one recession. Other 
events affecting forecast accuracy such as the oil-shocks in the 1970s and 1980s, Ger-
man unification, the first fiscal consequences of the Maastricht treaty, the Asia/Russia 
crisis in 1997/98, and the beginning of the Great Recession of 2008ff. are also included. 
As a consequence, the size and tendencies of the error measure values calculated for one 
or two cycles hardly differ from the decade-based results reported in the following pag-
es. (This and all other results not reported here, data and sources are available as sup-
plementary material on the GER website.)  
The forecasts offer predictions for the remaining part of the current year as well as for 
the following year, but we analyse only the year-ahead predictions. Forecasts are pub-
lished over a stretch of four months: October (JD), November (CEE), December 
(OECD), and January (GAER), but the information on which they are based are not too 
different (on this point see Döhrn and Schmidt, 2011). The JD, CEE and, given its three 
months of reconciliation, also the OECD forecasts, have to start from NA data ending 
                                                 
3   The JD is a group of four to six major German research institutes who produce macroeconomic fore-
casts twice a year under a contract with the Federal Government. The composition of the JD has 
changed several times; currently main contractors are: Ifo-Institut für 
Wirtschaftswirtschaftsforschung, München; Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), Kiel; Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH), Halle; and Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI) Essen. Until recently the group included also Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin, and Hanseatisches Weltwirtschaftsarchiv (HWWA), Hamburg.  5 
with the second quarter. The GAER, however, can start from data for the third quarter 
and can probably also use the Federal Statistical Office’s first estimate of GDP for the 
past year, which is issued in mid-January (of the following year). In the period studied 
here, there were only a few cases in which macroeconomic developments and events of 
essential importance occurred between October and January. Although the GAER fore-
casts use more information, notably more recent data, and thus should be more accurate, 
this is hardly the case.      
The JD’s and the CEE’s forecasts have been published for some time with rates of 
change rounded to 0.5 percentage points; if forecasts have been presented as ranges (e.g. 
the GAER), the mean value has been taken. As actuals we used, as is now common 
practice, the NA-data released by the German Statistical Office as close as possible to 
the forecast, usually in February of the following year. In order to provide a fair basis of 
comparison, all forecasts and actual data were rounded. A comparison of the results of 
rounded with decimal point OECD forecasts for Germany  showed hardly any differ-
ences, and if there were differences they rarely exceeded the value of 0.1 (Table 4). Of 
course, rounded values offer less information, but the quality of forecasts as determined 
by their degree of disaggregation, theoretical foundation, timeliness, past accuracy etc. 
(Wild, 1973, pp. 134ff.) is of no interest here. In 1993, the Federal Statistics Office 
changed its NA concepts and replaced GNP with GDP as its measure of output. Hence, 
until 1993, “growth” is associated with real GNP, and thereafter with real GDP; the in-
flation indicator was changed correspondingly. In 2004, the Federal Statistical Office 
started a new NA system and switched to chain weighted deflation. As forecasts fol-
lowed this standard, this switch should not affect the present analysis.   
Our measures of forecast accuracy include descriptive statistics as well as parameter 
tests, tests for directional accuracy, and rationality tests. To measure forecast accuracy 
we focus on mean absolute error (MAE, error: pt – at with p: forecast value, a: actual), 
bias, and root-mean-square error (RMSE). As a benchmark, comparative accuracy is 
measured by Theil’s U coefficient (based on extrapolating the previous rate of change pt 
= at-1). Given the general decline of both growth and inflation rates, the test may be seen 
as biased against an extrapolation of the previous year’s rates of change. Since the de-
cline extended over more than 40 years, this distortion should be small. The forecast 
performance associated with the difficulty of the task is measured by the relationship of 6 
RMSE/σ  (McNees, 1988).  Similarly,  the forecast performance was measured by 
RMSE/average growth rates of real GDP and inflation. The results were similar and not 
shown here.      
In analysing directional accuracy, we first describe the type of errors that were ob-
served, e.g. the failure to predict turning points and the number of over- and underesti-
mates that occurred. Then, we determine whether accelerations and decelerations in 
growth and inflation rates were correctly predicted. We use the concept of “informa-
tional content” (IC), which compares the number of forecasted accelerations (or decel-











with AC: increase forecast and realized; AW: increase forecast, decrease realized; DC: 
decrease forecast and realized; and DW: decrease forecast, increased realized. For a 
forecast to have “informational content”, IC has to be > 1 (Merton, 1981).  
The rationality of forecasts, based on unbiasedness and efficiency, is tested using the 
Mincer/Zarnowitz equation (Mincer, Zarnowitz 1969). A sufficient condition for fore-
casts to be unbiased is that the joint null hypothesis α1 = 0 and β1 = 1 in regression (1) 
cannot be rejected. 
    t t 1 1 t u p β α a + ⋅ + = ,  (1) 
with at:= realized; pt:= forecast and ut the error term for which the assumptions of the 
classical regression model hold. The forecasts are efficient if β2 = 0 in (2) 
    t t 2 2 t u p β α e + ⋅ + = ,  (2) 
and ρ = 0 in (3). 
    t 1 t 3 t u e ρ α e + ⋅ + = − .  (3) 
Like Theil’s inequality coefficient, this test is based on the assumption that the previous 
year’s actual data are known, which the case is at best for the GAER. 
  
3. Results: The complete sample—a summary 7 
Forecasts and actual rates of growth and inflation for the full range of years are shown 
in Figure 1 and Table 5 (Appendix). The results of the accuracy analysis may be seen in 
Table 1. The MAE of the growth forecasts was about 1.5,  about  40%  of the mean 
growth rate. The bias is comparatively large. The MAE of the inflation forecasts is 
about 0.7, only 20% of the mean rate of inflation. Inflation forecasts are free from bias 
and all in all more accurate than growth predictions, contrary to findings for the U.S. 
and the U.K. 4 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Theil’s U coefficient indicates that the forecasts were superior to simple extrapolations 
of the previous actual rates of change. The average errors of all four groups were similar 
for both variables, with the JD’s higher growth errors being a possible exception. Alt-
hough the forecasts were highly correlated, we tested whether there was a statistically 
significant difference in the accuracy of the four groups. The forecasts for each year 
were ranked based on their accuracy. The average ranking test (also called analysis of 
variance by ranks) was also used (Batchelor, 1990). There was no significant difference 
among the four groups’ predictions of inflation but for growth. The values of χ
2 were 
9.46 and 0.62 for the growth and inflation forecasts, respectively. The critical 5%  value 
of the statistic with three degrees of freedom is 7.81. The tests of the growth forecasts 
were based on all 44 observations, but we only used the last 39 observations for the in-
flation predictions because the OECD did not forecast inflation in either 1967 or 1971. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Considered in light of a four-phase business cycle classification, forecasts are more ac-
curate during upswings and upper turning point phases than in lower turning point phas-
es (Figure 1). The JD and CEE failed to predict any of the five recessions that occurred 
in this period. The OECD and GAER were more successful, but mostly failed to predict 
the gravity of the recessions. This result is similar to U.S. and U.K. forecasts.  
                                                 
4   Although the forecast periods are not the same, it is possible to compare these results with those that 
Fildes/Stekler (2002, pp.443ff.) reported for the U.S. and U.K. In the U.S. the errors were about 25% 
of the mean absolute changes of both variables, while in the U.K. they averaged about 60%. It should 
also be noted that between 1968 and 1999, the MAE between the first and the final actual data  had 
been 0.4 percentage points for growth and 0.3 percentage points for inflation.  8 
German forecasts also displayed most of the systematic errors that have been long ob-
served in many countries. Fildes/Stekler (2002) note that the U.S. and U.K. forecasters 
underestimate GDP when it is growing and overestimate when it is declining; similar 
errors were observed when inflation was accelerating and decelerating. The forecasts for 
Germany exhibit the same patterns. About 25% of the growth forecasts are “overesti-
mates” and 50% of them are “underestimates”, while about 10% accurately predict the 
development and about 10% miss the turning points (Table 2). A similar pattern holds 
for the inflation forecasts, though with more incidences of agreement and fewer “turning 
point errors”.  
(Table 2 about here) 
All of the forecasters produced forecasts with sufficient informational content, yielding 
IC values > 1, indicating that most of the periods of acceleration and deceleration were 
anticipated correctly (Table 3). Differences in directional errors of growth and inflation 
forecasts are about 0.7 on average for both accelerations and decelerations, varying little 
between forecasters.  
(Table 3 about here) 
Finally, the regression rationality test did not reject the null hypothesis that forecasts are 
unbiased. However, the hypotheses of the efficiency of both GDP growth and inflation 
forecasts were rejected. The β-test (Equation 2) indicated that the forecast errors were 
positively related to the forecasts, and the ρ-test (Equation 3) revealed that most forecast 
errors were autocorrelated.  
 
4. Results: accuracy over time 
Starting with directional errors, for GDP growth forecasts the number of coincidences as 
well as turning point errors remain rather stable until the most recent period; the rela-
tionship between overestimates and underestimates fluctuates (Table 2). Inflation fore-
casts were generally underestimated when inflation was increasing (in the 1970s) and 
overestimated when it was decreasing (in recent years). 
The small number of observations in each sub period precludes formal statistical tests, 
but descriptive results can be obtained from the information content (IC) statistics. If 
there had been an increase in accuracy over time, these statistics should have increased 9 
from the 1970s to the present. However, this has not generally been the case (Table 3). 
The information content of the growth forecasts deteriorates in the 1980s, generally im-
proves in the 1990s, and declines again thereafter, suggesting that there is no tendency 
towards a monotonic improvement in directional accuracy. A similar result can be ob-
served for inflation.    
The interpretation of the time trend of the quantitative forecast errors depends on which 
error measure is used. For the growth forecasts simple trend results over the complete 
sample suggest for all four institutions stable average errors (AE). Looking at the dec-
ades, while MAEs declined considerably in the 1980s and 1990s but in the most recent 
decade returned to 1970s levels (Table 1); pairwise t-tests show no differences for the 
MAE (90%). The bias developed similarly. Theil’s U is rather constant, but in the most 
recent decade forecasts by both the JD and CEE were considerably higher than that of 
the GAER – a result mainly due to the errors of the former in 2009. The picture for in-
flation is much better: the trend shows a clear but small (-0.02) significant decline. The 
large errors in the 1970s, results of the wage explosion in the early 1970s and the oil 
shock, both seen only after the fact, are followed by a decline of the MAE to about 0.5, 
with accompanying small values for bias and Theil’s U. The pairwise tests of the MAE, 
suggest significant improvements in the 1980s vs. the 1970s and the 1990s vs. the 1980s 
for the JD and the CEE, and for the 1990s vs. the 1990s vs. the 1980s for the OECD.        
We have not examined the results from a comparative perspective. In particular, we did 
not adjust for the difficulties involved in forecasting, though Theil’s U might be seen as 
doing this implicitly. One possible adjustment is to divide the RMSE by the standard 
deviation of the actual changes that occurred in each period. The last entry in each panel 
of Table 1 presents this measure. The results indicate that the forecast errors, adjusted 
for this variability, improved by a small degree for the growth forecasts and considera-
bly for the inflation forecasts in the 1980s and 1990s, but exceeded or returned to their 
70s’ levels in the 2000s. Overall, there is some evidence of minor improvements in ab-
solute forecasting accuracy, particularly if the oil and wage shocks of the 1970s are tak-
en into account; however, relative stability has been rather constant (though the 2009f. 
experience is a serious challenge to this finding). These findings may be further quali-
fied by pointing out the falling trend of the rates of growth and inflation over the last 45 10 
years. Indeed, standardizing MAEs by the average rates of growth and of inflation also 
shows statistics move steadily.   
The data reveal some factors that reduce accuracy and suggest areas where a forecaster 
should invest more effort in order to improve accuracy. The effects of the errors made in 
predicting the recessions and downswings of 1974, 1980/81, 2001, and 2009/10 can be 
identified even in the recursive accuracy of growth forecasts  mentioned above  (not 
shown here). While this finding suggests that greater emphasis should be placed on 
timely predictions of recessions (not a new demand), it must be remembered that fore-
casters in other countries also fail to predict the onset of recessions (and recoveries), as 
the recent crisis has demonstrated once more. 
Similarly, the impacts of wage inflation and oil shocks on inflation can be observed in 
the first half of the 1970s, but the error statistics steadily return towards their previous 
“limits” after these events. The most plausible explanation is that exogenous inflation 
impulses and internal inflation behaviour simply normalized (see Figure 1), and fore-
casters were able to forecast more accurately in this environment. However, the error 
statistics show a declining trend up to the Great Recession of 2009f. that seems to be 
approaching a limit, i.e. a level beyond which accuracy cannot go, at least not with the 
current state of knowledge, forecasting methods, and data. This result is corroborated 
when examining the OECD’s forecasts for the G7-countries (Table 4). The anticipated 
major improvements cited above do not seem likely to materialize in the near future. 
While Fildes/Stekler (2002) did not discuss the limits of accuracy, their results are com-
patible with this view.  
(Table 4 about here) 
Further improvement is, of course, an important area of investigation, which can both 
help to judge the present state of forecasting and also help to identify some areas in 
which improvement is possible. We employ a macroeconometric model to do so, with 
similar aggregative detail as the forecasts analysed above. Static ex post-simulations 
within the sample period, that is successively solving the model for each with actual 
values of the exogenous and lagged endogenous (“predetermined”) variables, produce 
the most accurate results possible with this model and thus supply a benchmark. The 
errors produced by this model are the sum of the single equation errors and the one-
period “model errors”. They are lower than that of ex ante model forecasts because they 11 
are free from errors caused by incorrect predetermined variables, the model’s limited 
capacity to capture the dynamics of multi-period forecasts, or the model’s limited stabil-
ity outside the sample period, i. e. in ex ante-forecasts.    
Suppose that the ex ante forecast errors produced by a model are comparable to those of 
the institutions’ forecasts for the same period. In this case a comparison of the ex-ante 
and the static ex post-forecasts would indicate the limits of forecast accuracy, i.e. the 
accuracy that could be attained with perfect forecasts of the predetermined variables, 
perfect capture of the model dynamics, and stable relationships in the forecast period. 
Increased accuracy would be possible only by increasing the accuracy of the model’s 
single equations and their static interactions.  
For this exercise, we use the RWI business cycle model, a medium sized (quarterly) 
macroeconometric model employed since the late 1970s for short term ex ante forecast-
ing and simulations. The model was constructed to complement the JD; it has the same 
aggregative details and uses the same set of assumptions. For details of the model and 
its ex post and ex ante performance, see Heilemann (2004). The model produces higher 
forecasting accuracy than that produced by time series models, which are often used as 
benchmarks (Döhrn, Kitlinski and Münch, 2009). Of course, other models and other 
types of models could also be used. It would be interesting whether they come to differ-
ent results. As to applied structural models with a similar closure (the set of predeter-
mined and explained variables) as in the RWI-model we speculate that the outcome 
would not differ too much from the present results. 
We used this model to produce static ex post forecasts for each of the years from 1980 
to 1989. Each forecast was based on the actual values of all predetermined variables. As 
an example, based on the sample period 1971-I to 1980-IV (the model estimation uses a 
40-quarter-moving sample) data up to the first half of 1979 were used to forecast the 
second half of that year and all of 1980. Hence the year ahead forecast was the result of 
six consecutive static forecasts for the current year’s third and fourth quarters and for 
each quarter of the next full year.       
The model’s MAE for the growth forecasts for the period 1980 to 1989 was 0.6 percent-
age points, though the results seem to have benefitted from some small aggregations 12 
gains on the demand side.5 For inflation, the MAE was 0.4 percentage points, which is 
very similar to the ex ante errors of the four forecasting institutions analysed here. This 
suggests that the inflation forecasts for this period achieved the highest possible level of 
accuracy. However, like all other accuracy statements in an interdependent environment 
(which carry the risk that the figures are “right for the wrong reason”), this result should 
be taken with a grain of salt. Unsurprisingly, the model was substantially more accurate 
in predicting the rate of growth. It made no turning point errors, and its errors were only 
about 60% as large as those made by the four organizations. If the model’s errors are 
seen to represent some kind of maximum accuracy attainable given the state of macroe-
conomics, modelling, and forecasting in the 1980s, which still holds now, we provide 
the following interpretation: The accuracy of ex ante growth forecasts can still be con-
siderably improved. However, such improvement requires a perfect forecast of world 
trade, interest rates, government investment outlays, and the price of oil (to name some 
of the macroeconomic assumptions used in the forecasts for Germany), as well as stable 
economic reactions. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions  
Quantitative macroeconomic forecasting for Germany is only modestly accurate. For the 
last 45 years the absolute sizes of the errors in predicting both growth and inflation have 
been about 1.3 and 0.7, respectively. These results are similar to previous findings for 
Germany as well as the U.S. and the U.K.   
More disappointingly, better theories, data, and methods have not appeared to offer sub-
stantial improvement. While the accuracy of growth forecasts improved somewhat in 
the 1980s and 1990s, it deteriorated in the past decade, returning to the levels of the 
1970s. This trend can also be observed in OECD forecasts for the G7 countries. Even 
worse, temporary improvements seem to be mainly due to the decline of the variance of 
                                                 
5   Though the present paper does not aim to compare different methods, it should be noted that the 
model’s ex ante performance for this period was unusually impressive. The MAE of its forecasts for 
growth (inflation) was 0.7 (0.4), while with actual figures for the exogenous variables this figure was 
0.2 (0.1). For 1980/1990 results were 0.9 (0.5), and for 1990/1999 1.2 (0.6). With actual figures for 
the exogenous variables the corresponding results were 0.3 (0.2) and 0.3 (0.2). These results included 
considerable add factoring, dynamic errors, etc., and therefore cannot serve as benchmarks for the 
model’s accuracy.     13 
growth and inflation (and their levels). Improvements in directional accuracy have been 
even slighter. With few exceptions, the recessions in 1975, 1981/82, 1993, 2001 and 
most of the 2008ff. crisis were seen only after the fact. The upswings in the late 1960s, 
early 1990s, and 2010 were similarly not predicted. Consequently, we should hold only 
modest expectations of sizeable or continuous improvements in forecasting accuracy in 
the near future.  
As  the  macroeconometric model exercises suggest,  there is room for improvement, 
though it would be interesting to see how much this differs according to model time. But 
these exercises also demonstrate that this margin is much smaller than often assumed, 
and improvement will be hard to achieve. To realize improvement, forecasters should 
start with detailed forecast evaluations determining, tracing, categorizing, and publiciz-
ing forecast errors. Are errors the result of faulty assumptions, misleading theories, em-
pirical irregularities, insufficient data, etc.? As little  is known about the forecasting 
techniques and their operation by the four institutions examined here, forecasters them-
selves must carry out these evaluations. Third parties, who have carried out the bulk of 
forecast evaluation so far, are not in a position to accomplish such investigations. Mac-
roeconomic forecasts such as those we have examined here are conjoined, multivariate, 
and multi-period forecasts – examining only forecasts of highly aggregated variables 
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Figure 1 
Accuracy of forecasts of real GDP and of GDP price deflator for Germany 
1967 to 2010 
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Table 1 
Annual forecasts of percentage changes of real GDP and of GDP price deflator: 
summary measures of error, 1967 to 2010 
  real GDP  GDP price deflator 
  JD  CEE  OECD  GAER  JD  CEE  OECD  GAER 
  1967 to 2010 
MAE  1.5  1.3  1.3  1.1  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.7 
Bias  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.0  -0.1  0.0         -0.1 
U  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 
RMSE/ σ  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
  1970 to 1979 
MAE  1.9  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.3     0.8  1.2     
Bias  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6  -0.7  -0.8         -0.4  -0.9          
U  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.5  0.7 
RMSE/ σ  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.8     0.8        0.7         0.8 
  1980 to 1989 
MAE  1.1  0.9  1.0  1.0  0.4  0.5  0.8  0.5 
Bias  -0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2 
U  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.4  0.6  0.9  0.6 
RMSE/ σ  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.5 
  1990 to 1999 
MAE  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.8   0.5  0.6  0.4  0.5 
Bias  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.1 
U  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.8  0.9  0.6  0.7 
RMSE/ σ  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.4 
  2000 to 2010 
MAE  1.7  1.5  1.2  1.1  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6 
Bias  0.7   0.7  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.4 
U  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8 
RMSE/ σ  1.1  1.0  0.7  0.6  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.1 
Authors´ computations.  –  For abbreviations and computation of the error 





Annual forecasts of percentage changes of real GDP and of GDP price deflator: 
summary measures of directional errors, 1968 to 2010 
  
  real GDP   GDP price deflator 
  JD  CEE  OECD  GAER  JD  CEE  OECD  GAER 
   
   
1968 to 2010 
 Overestimates   11  9  7  10  11  10  11  11 
 Underestimates  21  22  19  18  17  17  16  18 
 Turning p. errors  7  4  5  5  2  3  3  2 
 Coincidences  0  4  8  6  10  10  9  9 
 Not defined  4  4  4  4  3  3  4  3 
   
1970 to 1979 
 Overestimates  3  3  2  3  3  3  3  2 
 Underestimates  6  4  4  5  6  6  4  7 
 Turning. p. errors  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
  Coincidences  0  2  3  1  1  1  2  1 
  Not defined  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
   
1980 to 1989 
 Overestimates  2  1  1  1  3  2  4  2 
 Underestimates  5  6  4  3  4  4  4  4 
 Turning p. errors  2  1  2  2  0  1  1  1 
 Coincidences  0  1  2  3  3  3  1  3 
 Not defined  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
   
1990 to 1999 
 Overestimates  5  4  2  4  3  3  1  3 
 Underestimates  3  5  4  4  2  2  4  3 
 Turning pt. errors  2  0  1  1  1  1  0  0 
 Coincidences  0  1  3  1  3  3  4  3 
  Not defined  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1 
   
2000 to 2010 
 
  Overestimates  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  3 
  Underestimates  5  5  5  4  4  3  3  3 
  Turning pt. errors  2  2  1  1  1  1  2  1 
  Coincidences  0  0  0  1  2  3  2  2 
  Not defined  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2 
Authors’ computations. For sources and computation see text. – 1 Qt = (pt – at-1) / (at – 
at-1), pt at: forecast, actual, rates of change, with: Qt >1: overestimate; 0 ≤  Qt <1: under-
estimate; Qt < 0: turning point estimate; Qt = 1: coincidence, for pt = at-1 the measure is 
not defined (for details see Heilemann, 1998).   19 
Table 3  
Accuracy of forecasts of directional change of real GDP growth and of GDP price deflator for Germany 
1968 to 2010 
  JD  CEE  OECD  GAER 
  IC  AC  AW  DC  DW  IC  AC  AW  DC  DW  IC  AC  AW  DC  DW  IC  AC  AW  DC  DW 
  Real GDP 
1968 to 2010  1,2  9  7  18  9  1,6  14  4  21  4  1,4  11  5  19  8  1,5  14  7  18  4 
                                         
1970 to 1979  1,4  3  2  4  1  1,9  3  0  6  1  1,9  3  0  6  1  1,4  3  2  4  1 
                                         
1980 to 1989  0,9  1  2  4  3  1,6  3  1  5  1  1,2  2  2  4  2  1,2  2  2  4  2 
                                         
1990 to1999  1,9  3  0  6  1  1,9  3  0  6  1  1,2  2  2  4  2  1,7  4  2  4  0 
                                         
2000 to 2010  0,8  1  3  4  3  1,3  3  3  4  1  1,5  3  1  5  2  1,6  3  1  6  1 
  GDP price deflator 
1968 to 2010  1,4  10  4  21  8  1,3  8  5  22  8  1,5  7  2  23  8  1,3  9  7  20  7 
                                         
1970 to 1979  1,3  3  1  3  3  1,2  2  1  4  3  1,5  2  0  3  3  1,0  2  2  3  3 
                                         
1980 to 1989  1,8  2  0  6  2  1,8  2  0  6  2  1,8  2  0  6  2  1,6  3  1  5  1 
                                         
1990 to 1999  1,3  2  2  5  1  1,3  2  2  5  1  1,5  2  1  6  1  1,5  2  1  6  1 
                                         
2000 to 2010  1,5  2  1  7  1  1,2  1  2  7  1  1,4  1  1  8  1  1,1  1  3  6  1 
Authors’ computations. For sources and computations, see text. – AC (AW): acceleration correctly (wrongly) forecast, DC (DW): deceleration correctly (wrongly) 
forecast, IC: informational content. 20 
    Table 4 
    OECD annual growth and inflation forecasts: 
 summary measures of error, 1967 to 2010     
    Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  UK  US  G7  OECD 
    1967 to 2010 
MAE 
a  1.3  0.9  1.4  1.4  1.7  1.0  1.0  0.8  0.9 
b  1.3  0.7  0.6  1.3  1.5  1.4  0.8  0.6  0.7 
Bias 
a  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.1 
b  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.8  0.3  -0.5  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3 
U 
a  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5 
b  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.9  0.9  0.6  0.8  0.5  0.9 
RMSE/σ 
a  0.8  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.7 
b  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.4 
    1970 to 1979 
MAE 
a  1.2  1.1  1.5  2.7  2.3  1.4  1.0  0.4  1.1 
b  1.8  1.2  0.9  3.4  3.6  3.4  1.5  0.4  1.4 
Bias 
a  0.6  0.2  0.5  0.4  0.8  0.8  0.7  -0.1  0.5 
b  -1.4  -0.8  -0.6  -2.9  -1.0  -2.7  -0.8  -0.1  -1.1 
U 
a  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.4  0.2  0.5 
b  0.9  0.6  0.6  1.0  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.2  0.9 
RMSE/σ 
a  0.8  0.8  0.8  1.1  0.9  1.0  0.5  0.2  0.7 
b  0.8  0.5  0.7  0.8  1.0  0.7  0.8  0.2  0.9 
    1980 to 1989 
MAE 
a  1.5  0.7  1.1  0.9  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.7 
b  1.0  0.5  0.6  1.4  1.1  1.1  0.8  0.8  0.6 
Bias 
a  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.8  -0.6  -0.7  -0.4 
b  0.2  0.0  -0.3  -0.9  0.8  -0.2  0.8  -0.5  0.3 
U 
a  0.6  0.8  0.9  0.6  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.6  0.6 
b  0.7  0.4  0.7  0.6  1.5  0.5  0.8  0.5  0.8 
RMSE/σ 
a  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.6  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.7 
b  0.4  0.2  0.6  0.3  1.3  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.3 
    1990 to 1999 
MAE 
a  1.5  0.9  1.0  0.9  1.4  1.1  1.3  0.6  0.7 
b  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.8  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.6  0.5 
Bias 
a  0.8  0.4  0.1  0.7  0.7  0.4  -0.4  -0.2  0.1 
b  1.0  0.5  0.2  -0.2  0.4  0.0  0.1  -0.2  -0.4 
U 
a  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.8 
b  1.2  1.2  0.6  0.8  0.9  0.7  0.9  0.7  1.5 
RMSE/σ 
a  0.8  0.9  0.8  1.1  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9  1.0 
b  1.2  0.6  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.2  0.4  0.9  1.1 
    2000 to 2010 
MAE 
a  1.1  0.7  1.3  1.2  1.6  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.0 
b  1.0  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.4 
Bias  a  0.3  0.6  0.4  0.9  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 21 
b  -0.5  0.0  0.1  -0.2  0.7  -0.1  -0.3  0.0  -0.2 
U 
a  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.5 
b  0.4  0.7  0.7  0.7  1.4  0.9  1.0  0.9  1.0 
RMSE/σ 
a  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7 
b  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.6  1.7  1.2  0.9  1.1  1.0 
Authors´ computations. For sources, abbreviations and computation of the error measures, see text. – a) real GDP; b) GDP 
deflator.  22 
Appendix 
Table 5 
Forecasts and actual data, 1967 to 2010 
 
  real GDP  GDP-Deflator 
  JD  CEE  OECD  GAER  Actual  JD  CEE  OECD
1  GAER  Actual 
1967  2.5  3.0  3.5  2.0  0.0  2.5  2.0  .  2.0  0.5 
1968  5.0  4.0  3.5  4.0  7.0  2.0  1.5  2.5  2.5  2.0 
1969  3.5  4.5  5.0  4.5  8.0  2.5  3.0  2.5  2.5  3.5 
1970  4.0  4.5  4.5  4.5  5.0  4.5  5.0  4.5  5.0  7.5 
1971  4.0  4.5  3.0  3.5  3.0  5.0  5.0  .  4.5  8.0 
1972  1.0  1.0  2.0  2.5  3.0  5.0  5.0  6.0  5.0  6.0 
1973  5.0  5.5  5.5  4.5  5.5  5.5  6.0  5.5  5.5  6.0 
1974  3.0  2.5  3.5  1.0  0.5  7.0  7.5  7.0  7.0  6.5 
1975  2.5  2.0  2.5  2.0  -3.5  7.0  6.0  6.5  6.5  8.0 
1976  4.0  4.5  3.5  4.5  5.5  4.5  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.0 
1977  5.5  4.5  3.5  5.0  2.5  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.5 
1978  3.0  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  4.0 
1979  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.5  4.0 
1980  2.5  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.0  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.0  5.0 
1981  0.0  0.5  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5  4.5  4.0  4.0  4.5  4.5 
1982  1.0  0.5  1.5  1.5  -1.0  4.5  4.0  3.5  4.0  5.0 
1983  0.0  1.0  1.5  0.0  1.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.0 
1984  2.0  2.5  2.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  3.0  3.5  3.0  2.0 
1985  2.0  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.0  3.0  2.0  2.0 
1986  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.5  3.0  2.0  2.0  2.5  3.0 
1987  3.0  2.0  3.0  3.0  1.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  2.0 
1988  2.0  1.5  1.5  2.0  3.5  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5 
1989  2.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  4.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.5 
1990  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  4.5  3.0  3.5  3.0  2.5  3.5 
1991  2.5  3.0  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.5  4.5  4.0  4.5 
1992  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.0  4.0  4.0  4.5  4.0  4.5 
1993  0.5  0.0  0.5  -0.5  -2.5  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5 
1994  1.0  0.0  0.5  1.0  1.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.0 
1995  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.5  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 
1996  2.5  2.0  2.5  1.5  1.5  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.0 
1997  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.5  2.0  1.0  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.5 
1998  2.5  2.5  2.5  3.0  2.0  1.0  2.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
1999  2.5  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.0  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.0 
2000  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  3.0  1.0  1.0  1.5  1.0  -0.5 
2001  2.5  3.0  2.5  3.0  0.5  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.5 
2002  1.5  0.5  1.0  1.0  0.0  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.5  1.0 
2003  1.5  1.0  1.5  1.0  0.0  1.0  1.5  1.0  2.0  0.5 
2004  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.0  0.5  1.0  1.0  0.5 23 
Table 4, continued  
  real GDP  GDP-Deflator 
  JD  CEE  OECD  GAER  actual  JD  CEE  OECD
1  GAER  actual 
2005  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.5 
2006  1.0  1.0  2.0  1.5  2.5  1.0  0.5  0.5  1.0  0.5 























2010  1.0  1.5  1.5  1.5  3.5  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.5  0.5 
Sources: Arbeitsgemeinschaft, 1966ff.; Sachverständigenrat, 1966ff., OECD, 1966ff.; 
Bundesregierung 1967ff.,. All numbers rounded. 
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Table 1, GER Supplement 
Correlation of major institutions’ forecasts for Germany, 1967 to 2010 
  








    JD  CEE  OECD  GAER 
JD  1967 to 2010  -  0.96  0.96  0.97 
  1970 to 1979  -  0.92  0.94  0.96 
  1980 to 1989  -  0.92  0.83  0.95 
  1990 to 1999  -  0.95  0.96  0.95 
  2000 to 2010  -  0.50  0.81  0.72 
CEE  1967 to 2010  0.90  -  0.95  0.96 
  1970 to 1979  0.92  -  0.92  0.96 
  1980 to 1989  0.80  -  0.92  0.95 
  1990 to 1999  0.95  -  0.93  0.91 
  2000 to 2010  0.75  -  0.53  073 
OECD  1967 to 2010  0.76  0.84  -  0.97 
  1970 to 1979  0.72  0.80  -  0.95 
  1980 to 1989  0.83  0.81  -  0.90 
  1990 to 1999  0.92  0.95  -  0.99 
  2000 to 2010  -0.11  0.28  -  0.69 
GAER  1967 to 2010  0.76  0.80  0.87  - 
  1970 to 1979  0.74  0.80  0.55  - 
  1980 to 1989  0.96  0.80  0.89  - 
  1990 to 1999  0.87  0.92  0.86  - 
  2000 to 2010  -0.12  0.25  0.97  - 25 
 
Table 2, GER Supplement 
Annual forecasts of percentage changes of real GDP and of GDP price deflator: 
 summary measures of error cycles, 1967 to 2010 
  real GDP  GDP price deflator 
  JD  CEE  OECD  GAER  JD  CEE  OECD
1  GAER 
  1967 to 2010 
MAE  1.5  1.3  1.3  1.2  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7 
BIAS  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  -0.0  -0.1  -0.0          -0.1 
U  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 
RMSE/ σ  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
  1967 – 1974 
MAE  2  1.9  1.8  1.4  1.4  1.3  0.9  1.4 
BIAS  -0.5  -0.3  -0.2  -0.7  -0.8  -0.6  -0.6  -0.8 
U  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.3 
RMSE/ σ  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.6 
  1975 – 1982 
MAE  1.8  1.6  1.6  1.6  0.6  0.9  0.8  0.7 
BIAS  1.2  1.2  0.9  1.2  -0.1  -0.5  -0.4  -0.4 
U  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
RMSE/ σ  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.6 
  1983 – 1994 
MAE  1.2  1  1.1  1  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.5 
BIAS  -0.2  -0.2  0  -0.1  0  -0.1  0.1  -0.1 
U  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
RMSE/ σ  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.6 
  1995 – 2001 
MAE  0.9  0.8  0.6  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.6  0.6 
BIAS  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.7  0.5  0.4 
U  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.9  0.8  0.6 
RMSE/ σ  1.2  1.4  1.2  1.4  1.1  1.3  1.2  1 
  2002 – 2010 
MAE  1.8  1.5  1.2  1  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.5 
BIAS  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.4 
U  1.1  1  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.6 
RMSE/ σ  1.1  1  0.7  0.5  0.8  0.8  0.7  1.1 
Authors´ computations. For cycle demarcation see Heilemann, Schuhr 2008 (updated), for abbre-
viations and computation of the error measures, see text.  –  
1 Missing value for 1967 and 1971  
 26 
Table 3, GER supplement 
Annual forecasts of percentage changes of real GDP and of GDP price deflator: 
summary measures of error for two cycles, 1967 to 2010 
  real GDP  GDP price deflator 
  JD  CEE  OECD  GAER  JD  CEE  OECD
1  GAER 
  1967 to 2010 
MAE  1.5  1.3  1.3  1.2  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7 
BIAS  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  -0.0  -0.1  -0.0          -0.1 
U  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 
RMSE/ σ  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
  1967 – 1974 
MAE  2  1.9  1.8  1.4  1.4  1.3  0.9  1.4 
BIAS  -0.5  -0.3  -0.2  -0.7  -0.8  -0.6  -0.6  -0.8 
U  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.3 
RMSE/ σ  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.6 
  1975 – 1982 
MAE  1.8  1.6  1.6  1.6  0.6  0.9  0.8  0.7 
BIAS  1.2  1.2  0.9  1.2  -0.1  -0.5  -0.4  -0.4 
U  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
RMSE/ σ  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.6 
  1983 – 1994 
MAE  1.2  1  1.1  1  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.5 
BIAS  -0.2  -0.2  0  -0.1  0  -0.1  0.1  -0.1 
U  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
RMSE/ σ  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.6 
  1995 – 2001 
MAE  0.9  0.8  0.6  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.6  0.6 
BIAS  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.7  0.5  0.4 
U  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.9  0.8  0.6 
RMSE/ σ  1.2  1.4  1.2  1.4  1.1  1.3  1.2  1 
  2002 – 2010 
MAE  1.8  1.5  1.2  1  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.5 
BIAS  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.4 
U  1.1  1  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.6 
RMSE/ σ  1.1  1  0.7  0.5  0.8  0.8  0.7  1.1 
Authors´ computations. For cycle demarcation see Heilemann and Schuhr, 2008 (updated), for 
abbreviations and computation of the error measures, see text. – 
1 Missing value for 1967 and 
1971  
 
 
  